Hostage Crisis Redux, Day 8: A New Hope

The big news today is of a diplomatic note, as well as two more "apologies" from the sailors: yet another letter from Faye Turney, and a new apology from marine Nathan Thomas Summers.

The diplomatic note, from Iran to the UK, is the first written communication in that direction since the crisis began last Friday. Iran has published the contents of the note, which call for a guarantee of no future incursions, but do not appear to call for an apology. Another story claims that the note was written by Supreme Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, not President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Analytically, perhaps the most telling thing about the latest round of news is the depth of fractures within Iran's government. Writing from Tehran, Angus McDowall of The Independent writes about the divide between the hard-line Revolutionary Guard and the rest of Iran:

Last night the footage of Faye Turney was only being shown on Al Alam, an obscure satellite channel with close links to the Revolutionary Guards. Because it only broadcasts in Arabic rather than Persian, few Iranians would have seen the footage, suggesting there is still much opposition to escalating the crisis.

Likewise, a BBC story notes the silence of the President:

From the Iranian side, the crisis has been managed by the country's Supreme National Security Council, the highest body dealing with such important matters. Its decisions are approved by Ayatollah Khamenei, and all senior officials take part in its meetings.

President Ahmadinejad's silence may suggest that the clerical leadership is deliberately keeping him out of this matter in order to ensure that situation is not inflamed by his usual hardline rhetoric.

An article by McDowall from a few days ago gives the back story on the Revolutionary Guard:

There are 150,000 guards armed with the best weapons the Islamic republic can buy. By comparison, the conventional army has 300,000 troops but is ill-paid and less well-equipped...

A large militia, the Basij, is directed by the revolutionary guards. With several million recruits of all ages and both sexes, it was known in the war for ideological fervour and courage... Iran's special forces, the Qods Brigade, are under the guards' control and have close ties to the intelligence services. The brigade has been inconclusively linked to terrorism and assassinations outside Iran.

Unlike the conventional forces, the revolutionary guards answer to [Khamenei]. The supreme leader appoints top guardsmen, who profess themselves his "devotees".

In today's WaPo, David Ignatius writes an op/ed/spy essay:

BERLIN -- We are in a season of skulduggery in the Middle East, with a strange series of events that all involve the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The murky saga is a reminder that the real power in Iran may lie with this secretive organization, which spawned Iran's firebrand president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad... On Feb. 7, a top Revolutionary Guard officer named Brig. Gen. Ali Reza Asgari vanished in Istanbul... Officials in Washington, Paris and Berlin shrug and say, sorry, they just can't be helpful on this one. But a leading Israeli daily, Yedioth Aharonoth, reported soon after Asgari's disappearance that Mossad had organized his defection... His handlers may be Israelis posing as officers of another intelligence service, perhaps even during the debriefing.

The intricate Persian tapestry woven by all these reports ties together every political strand in Iran, with the Revolutionary Guard at the center. But that doesn't mean it makes sense. Riddle me this: if the Guard motivated as well as carried out the kidnapping, why is Guard-boss Khamenei pushing Ahmadinejad aside? Khamenei controls the guard - at least at high levels. And Ahmadinejad is a product of the Guard, both professionally and electorally. Who are the real hard-liners here? Who wanted the kidnapping, and why? Who benefits within Iran from pushing a crisis with the West?

If Khamenei's note is accepted, Britain issues a guarantee, and the hostages are freed, these questions will be swept under the rug, and Iran's Byzantium of ideologues will close ranks again on the nuclear issue and others. But if the crisis continues, it may reveal itself to be more a crisis within Iran than a crisis without.